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_______________ 
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_______________ 
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UNKNOWN D.O.C. BUS DRIVER AND  
TRANSPORTATION CREW;  
MARK CAPOZZA, Superintendent, in his personal and  
professional capacity;  
CAPT. MOHRING, in his personal and professional capacity 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01174) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan 
_______________ 
 
Argued: September 12, 2019 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 13, 2019) 
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Amir H. Ali   [ARGUED] 
Roderick & Solange  
MacArthur Justice Center 
777 6th Street NW 
11th Floor 
Washington, DC 20001  
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Mary L. Friedline 
Anthony T. Kovalchick [ARGUED] 
Kemal A. Mericli 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
1251 Waterfront Place 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
Counsel for Appellees 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
If a prisoner wants to file a § 1983 suit, he must exhaust the 
prison’s internal administrative remedies first. Because he 
must clear this hurdle before suing, we wait to start the limita-
tions clock until after he has exhausted them (or after his re-
lease, whichever comes first). This is true whether he sues from 
prison or sues after his release. Either way, the plaintiff had to 
delay filing while he exhausted his remedies in prison. 
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Former prisoner William Jones spent the last ten months of 
his Pennsylvania state prison sentence exhausting his adminis-
trative remedies for alleged violations of his constitutional 
rights. Just under two years after his release, he filed a § 1983 
claim against various prison officials. A magistrate judge, who 
was presiding with the parties’ consent, dismissed his com-
plaint as time-barred, finding that Jones had filed the claim af-
ter Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period had expired. 
But because we exclude the ten months Jones spent exhausting 
his administrative remedies from the two-year clock, Jones’s 
filing was timely. So we will vacate the magistrate judge’s or-
der. 
Though his claims are timely, some fail on other grounds. 
Jones failed to state a claim against two of the appellees. And 
his claim for injunctive relief became moot when he was re-
leased from prison. So we will affirm the dismissal of these 
claims. On remand, Jones may pursue his claims for monetary 
relief against the remaining defendants. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The bus incidents 
On reviewing this motion to dismiss, we take the allega-
tions in the complaint as true: Jones is a former Pennsylvania 
state prisoner. On October 31, 2013, he was on a prison bus, 
traveling to court for his post-conviction hearing. Jones struck 
up a conversation with a fellow inmate. In response, the bus 
driver “threaten[ed]” Jones and the other inmate, telling them 
to “shut up” or else he would take their boxes of property. App. 
93. The driver then intentionally switched Jones’s property box 
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with that of the other inmate. The box held Jones’s legal books 
and papers that he had prepared for the hearing. Without them, 
he could not present his arguments for a reduced sentence to 
the court. 
Almost two weeks later, Jones was waiting in line for an-
other prison bus. The same bus driver yanked him out of line, 
put him in the bus’s segregation cage, and berated him. Jones 
told the other inmates to get the names of the bus driver and 
transportation crew so he could report their actions. In re-
sponse, they took off their name tags. Jones never learned their 
names. 
The stress of this incident exacerbated his mental ailments 
and caused him to have a nervous breakdown. For two days 
after the second bus ride, he stayed in the prison’s medical an-
nex. 
A few days later, Jones filed a grievance with the prison, 
complaining of both trips. Over the next ten months, he refiled, 
appealed, and sent follow-up letters to the prison about his 
grievance. This back-and-forth ended in September 2014, 
when he was released from prison. As of then, the prison still 
had not decided his grievance. 
B. Jones’s complaint 
Just under two years after his release, Jones filed a pro se 
§ 1983 complaint against the unnamed bus driver and crew, Su-
perintendent Capozza, and Security Captain Mohring. He 
sought an injunction ordering the prison to reassign the bus 
driver and transportation crew. He also sought compensatory 
and punitive damages for his physical and mental suffering. 
5 
The District Court referred the case to a magistrate judge, 
who recommended dismissing the complaint as time-barred. 
Her reasoning followed a simple syllogism: § 1983 borrows 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal in-
jury claims. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 
626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). And Jones filed more than two years 
after the bus incidents. So the two-year limitations period, she 
reasoned, bars Jones’s claims. 
Jones objected to her calculation, arguing that the two-year 
period did not begin until he exhausted his administrative rem-
edies. The District Court agreed, finding that this Court’s deci-
sion in Pearson v. Secretary Department of Corrections re-
quires courts to toll statutes of limitations while prisoners ex-
haust their administrative remedies. 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 
2015). And because Jones filed less than two years after he was 
released, his complaint was timely. Still, the District Court dis-
missed his complaint for failure to state a claim. It also found 
that it would be futile to grant leave to amend, so it dismissed 
with prejudice. 
C. The first appeal, remand, and second appeal 
On appeal, we vacated the District Court’s order dismissing 
with prejudice. Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & 
Transp. Crew, 700 F. App’x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (per cu-
riam). We agreed that Jones’s original complaint had failed to 
state a claim, but we disagreed that any amendment would nec-
essarily have been futile. Id. We thus vacated and remanded to 
let Jones amend. Id. 
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On remand, Jones consented to jurisdiction before a magis-
trate judge. His case was then transferred to the same magis-
trate judge who had recommended dismissing his claim. She 
again dismissed his amended complaint as time-barred. She 
acknowledged that the limitations period is tolled for a pris-
oner who exhausts his administrative remedies before suing. 
But she held that the same rule does not apply to former pris-
oners who sue after their release. 
Jones now appeals. The magistrate judge had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(1) and 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 1291. We review de novo. 
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000). 
II. THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING  
JONES’S COMPLAINT AS TIME-BARRED 
A. The time a former prisoner spent exhausting his 
administrative remedies does not count toward 
Pennsylvania’s limitations period 
In Pearson, we held that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 
limitations for § 1983 claims is tolled while a prisoner exhausts 
his administrative remedies. 775 F.3d at 603. Today, we hold 
that this tolling rule benefits former prisoners too. The Penn-
sylvania tolling statute demands it. And including a former 
prisoner’s exhaustion period would give prison officials per-
verse incentives to delay the grievance process. 
Pennsylvania law provides: “[w]here the commencement 
of a civil action or proceeding has been stayed by a court or by 
statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of 
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the time within which the action or proceeding must be com-
menced.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5535(b) (emphases added). In 
Pearson, we held that “the PLRA[’s exhaustion requirement] 
is a statutory prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania’s statute of 
limitations.” 775 F.3d at 603 (emphasis added). 
The magistrate judge correctly noted that the PLRA’s ex-
haustion requirement no longer applies to former prisoners 
who complain of alleged constitutional violations that they suf-
fered in prison. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 
(3d Cir. 2002). We recognized in Ahmed that the PLRA com-
bats “frivolous litigation[ ]” only if it is filed “by idle prison-
ers.” Id. So we and “every [other] court of appeals to have con-
sidered the issue ha[ve] held that the PLRA does not apply to 
actions filed by former prisoners.” Id. at 210 n.10. Once the 
prisoner is released, “he can sue without meeting [the PLRA’s] 
exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 210. So, the magistrate judge 
explained, former prisoners are not entitled to the same tolling 
benefit as current prisoners. 
But even though the PLRA no longer creates a statutory 
impediment to a former prisoner’s filing, he can still claim the 
benefit of the Pennsylvania tolling statute. Whether the plain-
tiff exhausts his administrative remedies and sues from prison 
or exhausts in prison and later sues after his release, the plain-
tiff “has been” statutorily barred from suing while he ex-
hausted. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5535(b). In other words, upon his 
release, the exhaustion requirement no longer applies. But that 
change in circumstance does not alter the past restriction. In 
either situation, Pennsylvania’s tolling statute applies. 
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Plus, if we were to include the time a former prisoner spent 
exhausting, prison officials could simply run out the clock. By 
drawing out the grievance process for two years after a pris-
oner’s last injury, they could bar former prisoners from ever 
suing them. That cannot be so. Nothing in the text or design of 
the PLRA suggests that it lets prison officials dodge accounta-
bility by running out the clock. And Jones should not be penal-
ized for following the PLRA’s rules and trying to exhaust his 
administrative remedies while incarcerated. 
B. Jones’s complaint is not time-barred 
Under this rule, Jones’s filing was timely. The bus incidents 
happened in October and November 2013. Over the next ten 
months, he pursued his administrative remedies. This paused 
the running of the clock until he was released on September 5, 
2014. Upon release, he no longer had to exhaust. His release 
date was thus the first time that Jones could file a civil com-
plaint. Pennsylvania law gave Jones two years from his release 
date to sue. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. He sued on July 28, 2016, 
less than two years later. Thus his suit was timely. 
III. JONES FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST  
APPELLEES CAPOZZA AND MOHRING 
Though his claims are timely, some fail on other grounds. 
Besides suing the prison bus driver and transportation crew, 
Jones also sued Superintendent Capozza and Security Captain 
Mohring in their official and personal capacities. Jones’s 
claims against Capozza and Mohring in their official capacities 
are barred by sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (noting that a suit against a state 
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official in his official capacity is a suit against his office and 
cannot proceed under § 1983); Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
State Corr. Inst. at Greene, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
“shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immun-
ity”). 
Jones’s claims against Capozza and Mohring in their per-
sonal capacities fail too. He alleged no facts showing that either 
one had any personal involvement in the two bus incidents. Be-
cause § 1983 does not allow vicarious liability, “a plaintiff must 
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the of-
ficial’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Though we must 
construe pro se pleadings liberally, Jones did not allege any 
such facts. And he has already had two chances to tell his story, 
since we let Jones amend his complaint after his first appeal. 
So giving him further leave to amend would be futile. We will 
thus affirm the dismissal of Jones’s claims against Capozza and 
Mohring. 
IV. JONES’S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS MOOT  
Jones sought both money damages and an injunction to re-
assign the bus driver and transportation crew. But when he was 
released from prison, the request for an injunction became 
moot because he is unlikely to suffer any more harm from the 
bus driver or transportation crew. See City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–12 (1983) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). We will thus affirm the dismissal 
of his claim for injunctive relief. 
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* * * * * 
The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is tolled while 
a prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies in prison, 
whether he sues before or after his release. So Jones’s suit is 
timely, and we will vacate the magistrate judge’s dismissal and 
remand. Some of his claims fail for other reasons: he failed to 
state a claim against appellees Capozza and Mohring, and his 
claim for injunctive relief is moot. We will thus affirm the dis-
missal of these claims. On remand, Jones is free to pursue his 
claims against the unnamed bus driver and transportation crew 
in their personal capacities for money damages. 
